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ABSTRACT This article examines approaches and official discrepancies 
characterising Western European rhetoric with regard to the Kosovo status question. 
Since the early 1980s, Kosovo has been increasingly present in European debates, 
culminating with the 1999 international intervention in the region and subsequent 
talks about its final status. Although the Kosovo Albanians proclaimed independence 
in February 2008 and the majority of EU Member States decided to recognise Kosovo 
as an independent state, Western European rhetoric has been rather divided. This 
article shows that in addition to five EU members who have decided not to recognise 
Kosovo from the very beginning, and thus are powerful enough to affect its further 
progress, both locally and internationally, some of the recognisers, although having 
abandoned the policy of ‘standards before status’, have also struggled to develop full 
support for the province – a discrepancy that surely questions the overall Western 
support for Kosovo’s independence.   
 






Since the 1999 NATO-led involvement in then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
Western countries have generally been inclined to provide Serbia’s southern province 
of Kosovo with independence, often presenting it as the only way forward. Both 
Brussels and Washington officials have insisted that the Kosovo Albanians deserve to 
have their own state due to atrocities committed by the Serbian leadership over the 
last couple of decades. Following the 2008 unilateral declaration of independence by 
Kosovo, the persistence of two opposing expectations within the international 
community – that Kosovo will be recognised as soon as possible or that it will never 
become an independent state – has led to mounting confusion and disappointment 
about Kosovo’s final status. The fact that the province is still ‘neither here nor there’ 
is capable of affecting its own as well as regional progress, especially with regard to 
the accession to the European Union.  
Although often perceived by the Serbian leadership as being pro-Kosovo 
Albanian, however, the West is not fully united in discussions on Kosovo’s status, 
economic performance, political climate, membership in international institutions, 
strategies and legislation to address social issues and so on. The discrepancies 
characterising Western European official rhetoric do not only exist between states that 
support Kosovo independence and states that object to it (as is the case in the 
European Union, with 23 of its Member States recognising the Kosovo state and five 
– Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain – rejecting to do so), but also within 
the states that were actually amongst the first recognisers.  
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This article proves the existence of the above noted tendency by looking at 
official statements and reports (about the situation in Kosovo and decisions to 
recognise it) and, more precisely, by outlining the discrepancies existing between the 
dominant state representatives and their respective government departments (for 
example, in the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy). Accordingly, after a brief 
overview of the entry and presence of Kosovo in Western European rhetoric (through 
European Parliament debates), the article focuses on the post-1999 debates and 
arguments, with a particular emphasis being placed on the post-2008 official 
discrepancies. Apart from seeing such an approach as highly problematic, given its 
capacity to affect the international progress and reputation of Kosovo, the article 
encourages two substantial questions: ‘To what extent do Western European countries 
and Western Europe, in general, support Kosovo being an independent state?’ and 
‘What are the implications of the inconsistent Western approach?’  
 
 
II. Kosovo in Western European Rhetoric  
 
The archives of European Union institutions offer an important collection of 
documents about the relations between the then European Economic Community and 
the Yugoslav federation. Based on the available transcripts of European Parliament 
debates, Kosovo was mentioned for the first time in 1981, following the earlier riots, 
starting at the University of Priština and escalating into armed confrontations between 
Albanian students and the provincial police.i During the debate, a Member of the 
European Parliament called ‘the Foreign Ministers of the Member States meeting in 
political cooperation to express their concern to the Yugoslav government and to 
press for the Albanian section of the population of Yugoslavia to be guaranteed equal 
opportunities for development in economic, social, cultural and structural spheres’ 
(European Parliament, 1981). Some later debates also expressed similar concerns 
(European Parliament, 1983; 1989). In fact, by the end of the 1980s, the Europeans 
had become aware of the differences and tensions existing within the Yugoslav 
federation. In Yugoslavia, the republics of Slovenia and Croatia, concerned about the 
future of the Titoist state and frustrated by the obligation to support its less-developed 
regions, had already fostered their own contacts with the West – a project taken even 
further due to the rise of Slobodan Milošević and growing dominance of the Serbian 
regime (Radeljić, 2012). In Kosovo, whose autonomy was revoked in 1989 and many 
Kosovo Albanian professionals dismissed from their positions, the situation became 
even more complex, resulting in the policy of peaceful resistance and establishment of 
unofficial parallel institutions. Following the outbreak of the Yugoslav state crisis and 
Slovenia and Croatia’s declarations of independence in June 1991, the Kosovo 
Albanians decided to hold an unofficial referendum in September, to secure their own 
independence, and unofficial elections in May 1992, leading to the proclamation of 
the Republic of Kosovo (Krieger, 2001, p. 522).  
Given that European involvement in the Yugoslav space in the early 1990s 
was primarily concerned with the events in Slovenia, Croatia and, even more 
problematically, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Kosovo question seemed rather 
marginal. The fact that European Union representatives did not use the 1995 Dayton 
Peace Accords to also address the autonomous status of Kosovo was a serious matter 
of concern amongst Kosovo Albanians, interpreted as European disinterest in 
addressing their needs (Laakso, 2006, p. 152; Sell, 2002, p. 274; Toje, 2008, p. 52). 
Thus, leaving the Kosovo question unaddressed represented an opportunity for the 
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Kosovo Liberation Army to criticise and ignore a pacifist doctrine of the Democratic 
League of Kosovo – an approach that generated a number of confrontations between 
local Albanians and Serbian forces. The failure of an approach promoted by the pro 
bono Public International Law and Policy Group, in late 1998 (suggesting to begin 
with an intermediate sovereignty, characterised by a phased reduction of Serbian 
control over the province of Kosovo that would in turn allow the local people to 
acquire sovereign authority, capable of protecting legitimate interests of the Serbian 
minority, and finish with a referendum on independence and pursuit of international 
recognition) and the escalation of conflict in January 1999 (when Serbian forces 
committed a crime against humanity by killing more than forty civilians in the village 
of Račak, in central Kosovo)ii were clear indicators that external involvement of some 
sort would be required. By this point, the West had become fully aware of its failure 
to at first prevent, and then deal with the consequences of the 1995 Srebrenica 
genocide and the artificially divided state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to 
Joschka Fischer, then German Foreign Minister, acting politely with Belgrade 
officials would lead only to more mass graves, so he stated that the use of force 
should be considered: ‘I am not a friend of using force, but sometimes it is a 
necessary means of last resort. So I am ready to use it if there is no other way. If 
people are being massacred, you cannot mutter about having no mandate. You must 
act’ (Fischer cited in Cohen, 1999). Such a standpoint was further approved and made 
even more official when the US Secretary of State Madeline Albright visited the 
Rambouillet peace talks, launched to negotiate settlement between the two opposing 
sides, and stressed: ‘Let me say that if the talks crater because the Serbs do not say 
“Yes”, we will have bombing. If the talks crater because the Albanians do not say 
“Yes”, we will not be able to support them and in fact, will have to cut off whatever 
help they are getting from outside’ (War in Europe, 2000). 
The existing literature accompanying the 1999 Kosovo war has focused on all 
sorts of aspects, including the overall context (Bieber & Daskalovski, 2005; Buckley 
& Cummings, 2001; Judah, 2002; Kostovicova, 2005; Mertus, 1999; Phillips, 2012), 
the legality and consequences of the 1999 NATO involvement (Croft & Williams, 
2006; Falk, 1999; Glennon, 1999; Steinberg, 1999; Wedgwood, 1999), the post-
interventionist positions (Bacevich & Cohen, 2001; Bellamy, 2002; Daalder & 
O’Hanlon, 2000; Ker-Lindsay, 2009; Lambeth, 2001; Latawski & Smith, 2003; 
Tomuschat, 2002; van Ham & Medvedev, 2002) and the proclamation of 
independence and international recognition (Borgen, 2010; Hilpold, 2012; Perritt, 
2011; Summers, 2011; Weller, 2009). However, what the more recent accounts seem 
to have ignored to address relates to the implications of discrepancies characterising 
the Western European official rhetoric. The present lack of common position amongst 
the EU Member States does not only challenge the relations between them, but it also 
provides the Serbian authorities with an impression or, even more precisely, illusion 
that the Kosovo case could take a completely different direction and end up in their 
favour, as a constituent part of Serbia or, less desirably but still better than 
independence, as a province partitioned between the Serbs and the Kosovo Albanians.  
In addition, various government departments of the Western European countries that 
strongly support Kosovo’s independence, have contributed to the overall complexity 
by often providing highly discrediting information about Kosovo that in turn 
encourages a whole set of questions with regard to EU policy-making. 
 
 
III. From the ‘Standards before Status’ to a Status without Standards 
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Aware of the possible problems surrounding the implementation of its Resolution 
1244, adopted in June 1999, the UN Security Council welcomed ‘the work in hand in 
the European Union and other international organizations to develop a comprehensive 
approach to the economic development and stabilization of the region affected by the 
Kosovo crisis, including the implementation of a Stability Pact for South Eastern 
Europe with broad international participation in order to further the promotion of 
democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation’ (UNSC, 1999). 
As followed, the EU persuaded the international community to take part in the 
Stability Pact, launched the European Agency for Reconstruction in 2000 and 
introduced Stabilization and Association Process in 2001. The main task of these 
initiatives was to deal with instability in the Balkans and provide framework for 
stabilization and future development of the region.  
At the time, Javier Solana, the EU’s High Representative for Common Foreign 
and Security Policy, reminded the Kosovo Albanians that their independence was not 
on the agenda and that, technically, Kosovo was still part of Yugoslavia. He argued 
that the central assignment of international presence was to establish standards first 
and then discuss the final status (Radeljić, 2013, p. 24). However, the UN Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), established by the Resolution 1244, did 
not manage to consolidate the political standards. The dialogue between the mission 
and Kosovo institutions was not productive. For example, the appointment of 
international judges proved insufficient due to the constant pressures by extremists in 
the predominantly Albanian environment, unwilling to cooperate in finding the 
perpetrators of ethnically motivated crimes; according to one report, there were only 
15 international judges and 10 international prosecutors serving in the local justice 
system capable of dealing with only three percent of the criminal cases (Hartmann, 
2003). In addition, as warned internationally, ‘[t]he constant turnover and experience 
of staff in key positions undermined continuity and interrupted action on key 
initiatives’ (ICG, 2003). 
The two aspects that seriously questioned Western general sympathy for 
Kosovo independence in this period included the ‘standards before status’ approach, 
inaugurated by the third UNMIK chief, Michael Steiner of Germany, approved by the 
EU and welcomed by the Serbian authorities, and the expectations outlined during the 
EU-Balkans Thessaloniki summit in June 2003, expected to assess the region’s 
performance and its European future. Although the ‘standards before status’ policy 
covered a whole range of issues, ranging from the establishment of democratic 
institutions and rule of law to the development of market economy and dialogue with 
Belgrade authorities, its essence ‘was that it required Kosovo’s institutions of self-
government to demonstrate that they were willing and able to protect the rights of all 
of Kosovo’s ethnic communities, and had the capacity to act in a civilised way’ (Ante, 
2010, p. 150). Soon after, the EU-Balkans Thessaloniki summit, while noting that the 
future of the Balkans is in the EU, underlined that such a status will only be possible 
upon fulfilment of the same criteria used for the Central European states (EU Council, 
2003). The fact that by this point the Europeans had started replacing the American 
dominant role in the Balkans was often perceived amongst the Kosovo Albanians as a 
European intention to suspend any political discussion about the Kosovo final status 
and, even more worryingly, to support the Serbian position vis-à-vis the Kosovo 
status. They understood that the autonomy they got as a result of the Resolution 1244 
was, in fact, very limited (Mehmeti, 2013, pp. 197-198); even though elections were 
organised and Ibrahim Rugova, leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo, was 
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elected president of Kosovo, what the Albanians really got was an illusion of self-rule 
(Gallagher, 2005, p. 154).  
Once the EU had increased its presence, there was a general expectation that it 
would play a central role in the attempts determining the Kosovo’s future status. As 
its representatives agreed, the whole process would be based on the following key 
principles: ‘Kosovo must not return to the situation before March 1999 and Belgrade 
and Priština must move towards Euro-Atlantic integration; Kosovo’s status must be 
based on multi-ethnicity, the protection of minorities, the protection of cultural and 
religious heritage, and effective mechanisms for fighting organised crime and 
terrorism; [t]he solution of Kosovo’s status must strengthen regional security and 
stability; [a]ccordingly, there must be no change in the current territory of Kosovo 
(i.e. no partition of Kosovo and no union of Kosovo with any country or part of any 
country after the resolution of Kosovo’s status); ‘[a]ny solution must be fully 
compatible with European values and standards and contribute to realizing the 
European Perspective of Kosovo and of the region; Kosovo will continue to need 
international civilian and military presences’ (EU Council, 2005). The EU’s decision 
to phrase its position by relying on numerous ‘musts’ served only to further irritate 
the conflicting parties. Their leaderships felt that the trust between them and the EU 
was losing its momentum and that while the Kosovo Albanians had to try to get rid of 
the policy of ‘standards before status’, the Serbs were resurrecting their nationalistic 
feelings, leading to the deterioration of cooperation with the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and suspension of accession talks with the EU, in 
May 2006. 
The advocacy of ‘standards before status’, although an ambitious attempt, was 
fully eroded and abandoned after the riots in mid-March 2004,iii and replaced with a 
Standards Implementation Plan, with a particular focus on the economy, rule of law 
and dialogue between Belgrade and Priština. The international community, while 
positioned between the two opposing sides, understood that standards could not be 
satisfied any time soon, but also that lack of status and Kosovo’s security were 
affecting the entire Balkan region. As one author put it, ‘[s]ince the end of the Kosovo 
conflict in summer 1999, the international community has wrestled with a dilemma. 
There is no prospect for genuinely sustainable stability in the region as long as the 
status of Kosovo has not been resolved. At the same time addressing this issue in 
itself presents considerable risks to stability. If the international community tackles 
the status issue without adequate preparation, deadlock at best and confrontation at 
worst might be the result. If it waited for too long the unstable elements on the 
ground, in particular the impatience of the Kosovar population, the persistent 
economic crisis and the still tense relations between the ethnic communities might 
well lead to a new crisis’ (Lehne, 2004, p. 116). 
If we analyse the positions existing at the time, we can argue that the 
international community or, more precisely, the European Union, although often 
presenting itself as a player that had accumulated a vast knowledge skill throughout 
the 1990s when encouraging the integration of the Central European states into its 
structures. By relying on this experience, the Brussels administration continued to 
insist on the processes of democratization and Europeanization, which for the locals, 
given the pending status of the province, had no significance whatsoever. Simply put, 
the gap between internationally promoted wishes and actual needs could not lead to 
structural reforms, economic prosperity, and employment, even though they were 
widely acknowledged as a powerful motivating force for future membership in the 
EU; instead, the province continued to preserve its image of a black hole in the 
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Balkans, extremely corrupt and involved in trans-national organised crime. With these 
aspects in mind, it is not surprising that the immediate post-Kosovo crisis literature 
has tended to present the Kosovo case as a real test for the EU, expected to provide 
the Albanian side with nothing but full independence of Kosovo and to accommodate 
the consequent Serbian frustration: ‘It is difficult to see what participation in the 
affairs of Kosovo, if hardly any, there can be from the authorities in Belgrade. If it is 
possible to keep it within Serbia, regarding the status of Kosovo it can only be 
through a new version of autonomy, which allows the autonomous province most of 
the substance of independence without the formal status of diplomatic recognition and 
membership of the UN. It implies also that the armed forces of the bigger state to 
which they are attached will not be allowed access to the territory of the minority’ 
(Dent, 2001, p. 124).  
The Western European official rhetoric presented the infamous late-2005 
Vienna talks as a point, aimed at resolving the final status of Kosovo.iv As 
decentralisation was seen as capable of providing mechanisms to protect the 
minorities, the international mediators decided that the negotiation process between 
the Serbian and Kosovo Albanian representatives should begin with the very issue of 
decentralisation – already an important step given the earlier failure of a pilot project 
for the establishment of new municipalities in certain areas with Serbian majority 
(UNDP, 2006, p. 16). As followed, the January 2006 session was a complete failure; 
as observed afterwards, ‘neither side ha[d] given an inch’, meaning that ‘relief 
agencies are preparing for the least-bad option – another exodus of Serbs’ (Hundley 
2006: 1). In February, the mediators failed again to reconcile the two sides over the 
issue of local government reforms; while the Serbian side insisted that government 
decentralization should be started as soon as possible, the Kosovo delegates 
maintained that this was possible only after determining Kosovo’s status. During an 
even harder March round, the sides continued with their uncompromiseable views on 
government decentralisation in Kosovo. They discussed the problems of community 
financing, inter-communal cooperation, and the Serbian communities’ ties with 
Serbia. In addition, the Serbian team suggested that the Serbian communities should, 
apart from the local tax revenues, be financed from the Serbia’s national budget, 
while the Albanians argued that such an arrangemnt, like any other foreign aid, could 
enter Kosovo only through its central government. 
The subsequent exchanges of standpoints focused on communal borders, 
religious facilities, property relations, economic problems as well as the need for 
international presence after the Kosovo status determination. Still, the two sides did 
not want to change their initially adopted positions. For example, Serbian Prime 
Minister Vojislav Koštunica underlined that ‘the existence of Kosovo and Metohija as 
part of Serbia and the existence of the Serbian people in Kosovo are the key 
objectives of Serbia’s involvement in the political talks for the future status of that 
region’ and that any decision about Kosovo ‘should be made within Serbia, in the 
framework of the large autonomy of Kosovo and Metohija within Serbia, while any 
other decisions – be it power decentralisation or autonomy status – are just its 
specifications’ (Koštunica cited in Regnum, 2006). However, Koštunica affirmed that 
the Serbian government was ready to compromise to some extent and thus to provide 
the Kosovo province with ‘a large autonomy – something between independence and 
European-standard autonomy’. By contrast, Kosovo President Fatmir Sejdiu 
expressed his delegation’s ‘hope that the process started in Vienna will be finished 
quickly and successfully so that this year [2006] can really become a year for 
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determining Kosovo’s status in conformity with the people’s will – which is 
independence’ (Sejdiu cited in Regnum, 2006).  
The outcome of the expensive and time-consuming Vienna talks, which could 
have been predicted when it had become clear that the involved parties were not ready 
to compromise, confirmed the relevance of some previously offered arguments stating 
that a full independence of Kosovo could not be negotiated, but only imposed (Oberg 
& Mitić, 2005). However, the Western European rhetoric at the time – Solana and 
Rehn’s decision to launch a new mission, under the EU’s Common Security and 
Defence Policy, to provide Kosovo with support and assist it with necessary reformsv 
– presented the Europeans as interested in stabilizing the province so that it will be 
better prepared for its future status, while at the same hoping to see Serbian 
authorities focus on the country’s progress towards EU membership rather than 
preservation of Kosovo within Serbian borders. The problem was that the Brussels 
administration, while it decided to ignore the German-launched policy of ‘standards 
before status’ so that it could move on with the Kosovo status question, it did not 
come up with any substantial offer or, even more appropriately, compensatory award 
for the Serbian side, but rather continued with its conditionality policy.  
 
 
IV. 2008: Proclamation of Independence and after 
 
The 2008 Kosovo declaration of independence should not be perceived as a big 
surprise, especially given that various members of Serbia’s post-Milošević political 
elite, including the immediate prime minister Zoran Djindjić and some of his closest 
supporters, talked about the province of Kosovo as de facto independent and that 
Serbia had to focus on itself, meaning to move on with the processes of 
democratisation and Europeanisation. Still, the declaration was immediately 
challenged by the then Serbian leadership, resulting in an official call on the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) to deliver an advisory opinion on whether 
Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence was in accordance with international 
law. Both the declaration and the consequent court’s opinion that the Kosovo 
Albanian move did not really violate international law encouraged a proliferation of 
literature concerned with its legal aspects and, equally important, implications for the 
international system and future secessionist attempts (Borgen, 2010; Fierstein, 2008; 
Hilpold, 2012; Vidmar, 2009). As one study correctly put it, ‘[t]he ICJ’s ruling is 
nevertheless a strong card in the hands of Kosovo’s political leadership in its quest for 
full recognition of its independence. It is also a relief to the states that have so far 
recognised Kosovo’s independence. There are no signs yet that it will convince the 
other states in the international system that have so far refused to recognise Kosovo’ 
(Noutcheva, 2012, p. 108).     
Across the EU, a large majority of its Member States rushed to recognise the 
newly self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo. To begin with, the United Kingdom fully 
ignored its previously adopted position ‘[d]escribing the standards for Kosovo as the 
only way forward towards final status’, and clarifying that ‘[t]here was nothing 
automatic about the process. If Kosovo made the necessary progress in meeting the 
standards, it would continue to the next stage. But if not, it would have to undergo a 
further review’ (UNSC, 2004). Although the standards-related talk had disappeared 
and the British government openly supported the establishment of a new state, some 
of its departments have continued to offer rather negative accounts of Kosovo, clearly 
generating a dilemma regarding the United Kingdom’s general approach towards the 
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Kosovo question. For example, the Foreign and Commonweal Office’s section on 
travel and living abroad warns the potential travelers to Kosovo that the situation is 
‘tense’, characterised by ‘an underlying risk from terrorism’ and occasional ‘incidents 
of armed violence and vehicle explosions in major cities [that] are usually linked to 
organised crime’ (FCO, 2013). However, in case they would still decide to go there, 
they should try to avoid Leposavić, Zvečan, Zubin Potok and the northern part of the 
city of Mitrovica, thus Serb-dominated areas, ‘due to occasional violence there’ 
(FCO, 2013). The Foreign Office’s view largely corresponds to the one offered by the 
Red24, a London-based global security risk management group, suggesting ‘a high 
degree of caution’ when travelling to Kosovo and criticising the existing level of 
organised crime: ‘Corruption and black market activities are prevalent in Kosovo, 
with well-established crime syndicates engaged in lucrative trades in narcotics and 
weapons, as well as human trafficking. The failure to establish fundamental rule of 
law during the country's transition to independence has allowed these syndicates to 
develop links to and collude with legitimate business enterprises, key state institutions 
and even public office holders. There are also strong connections between organised 
crime leaders and the large Albanian diaspora elsewhere in the world, especially in 
neighbouring Albania’ (Red24, 2013).  
Similarly to the British, the German government, although clearly aware of the 
scale of organised crime activities and its detrimental effect on the stabilisation of 
post-1999 Kosovo (IEP, 2007), abandoned the idea of standards and rushed to 
recognise Serbia’s southern province as an independent state. Like the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, the German Federal Foreign Affairs has provided almost the 
same description and advice to potential travelers or even investors, warning that 
Kosovo is a country with many privately owned arms that are easily used, although, 
as underlined, not against the foreigners (Federal Foreign Office, 2013). Again, Italian 
official understanding of the situation in Kosovo is very similar to the previous two, 
leaving an impression that one should almost avoid going to Kosovo (Farnesina, 
2013). 
In contrast to the aforementioned EU Member States, who have recognised 
Kosovo, but remained rather suspicious about its settlement and future progress, there 
are five members who have rejected to follow the post-February 2008 trend of 
recognising Kosovo’s independence. For example, Romania has decided to stay firm 
and not to compromise its initial rhetoric, advocating that ‘the [Security] Council 
should give no consideration to any future status for the province until the standards 
spelled out by the international community become effective. The standards were not 
mere technical benchmarks; those were the measure of Kosovo’s transformation into 
an area offering safety and opportunities to all its inhabitants and into an area that was 
no longer a threat to regional stability. What was at stake was not only the status of a 
province, but that of each and every member of its population’ (UNSC, 2004).  
Thus, from the present perspective, it is possible to argue that the introduction 
and subsequent abandonment of the policy of ‘standards before status’ have generated 
a number of puzzling issues, both at EU and local levels. First, such a policy outlined 
the existence of inconsistencies concerning the overall EU standpoint, leaving space 
for speculations how and why it has been impossible to speak with a single voice. 
Even though the majority of individual EU Member States’ governments have 
recognised Kosovo, the post-2008 EU Progress Reports have portrayed Kosovo as 
extremely problematic – an aspect that easily questions the individual recogniser’s 
approach. As one of the reports observed, ‘Kosovo has to make further progress in 
establishing and consolidating the rule of law and needs to improve the functioning 
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and independence of its judiciary. It needs to establish a track record in the fight 
against corruption, money laundering and organised crime, demonstrating concrete 
results. Kosovo also needs to strengthen the capacity, independence and 
professionalism of its public administration and improve its business environment, 
including regulation, supervision and corporate governance. Kosovo has to ensure full 
transparency in senior public appointments and make sure that public procurement 
complies with criteria of independence, objectivity and transparency. Kosovo needs to 
establish a sustainable macro-economic and fiscal policy … Kosovo needs to improve 
the protection of Serb and other minorities and enhance dialogue and reconciliation 
between the communities’ (European Commission, 2009, p. 5). Similarly, the later 
reports outlined a whole range of problems, ranging from ‘weaknesses in tax and 
expenditure policies and, in law enforcement, including the fight against corruption 
and organised crime’ (European Commission, 2011, p. 31) to the lack of capacity ‘to 
improve implementation of the existing legal framework and enforcement of 
decisions remedying human rights infringements’ (European Commission, 2013, p. 
14). 
Second, the problematic policy provided EU Member States, namely the ones 
who have rejected to recognise Kosovo, with an opportunity to prevent or, at least, 
postpone secessionist attempts at home. Based on various debates, their position has 
been largely criticised by the 23 recognisers: for example, Ulrike Lunacek, a Member 
of the European Parliament from Austria goes as far as to state that the five should be 
forced to recognise Kosovo, but then clearly outlines various problems they can use 
as a justification as to why not to do it: ‘The relative weakness of the Kosovo 
government, after fraudulent elections and a prolonged process for the voting and 
inauguration of the new President and the formation of government in the spring of 
2011, as well as organised crime allegations by Dick Marty’s report in the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, do not give Prime Minister Thaçi 
the argumentative standing and power that he would need in order to show the 
necessary strength in the diplomatic arena and at home’ (Lunacek, 2012, p. 151).  
Locally, the whole ‘standards before status’ discourse has irritated the Kosovo 
Albanians as they understood that their status would not be resolved as quickly as 
they had initially thought. Official statements, delivered by the Brussels 
administration as well as individual EU governments have supported the presence of 
the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), due to the risks of escalation of 
conflict – an initiative welcomed by the local Albanians. However, the fact that its 
performance proved to be quite handicapped, mostly in relation to police, justice and 
customs matters (Greiçevci, 2011), made it very difficult for the Albanians to identify 
themselves with their own, independent, state. As Ilir Deda, the director of Kosovar 
Institute for Policy Research and Development, has put it, ‘five years ago, no one 
would have though that today Kosovo would not be a UN member, that we would not 
have a national football team and that we would be stuck in negotiations with Serbia 
… Many people think that Kosovo has not been given its fair chance yet. May it be 
the UEFA [Union of European Football Associations], the Eurovision Song Contest 
or the Council of Europe – for a membership in almost all international organisations, 
Kosovo is still sitting in the waiting room’ (Die Zeit, 2013). 
Finally, the Serbian leadership, fully aware of the international as well as 
Kosovo Albanian positions, has perceived ‘standards before status’ as a valid policy 
to insist on and try to postpone the overall settlement of the Kosovo status. More 
importantly, the fact that Kosovo has not been given a UN seat yet or that it has not 
been recognised by all EU Member States has been interpreted as an additional 
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opportunity, possibly resulting in a plan B. It is worth recalling that from the very 
beginning of the status talks, both Serbs and Kosovo Albanians presented themselves 
with a plan A only, meaning that one side would exit as an absolute winner and the 
other as an absolute loser. The international community played an important role in 
the formation of such uncompromisable approach. For example, it excluded partition 
based on the fact that it would imply forced population transfers to the northern or 
southern parts of the province, possibly accompanied by numerous clashes and 
casualties, and, it could be abused as a method of conflict settlement, capable of 
incentivising redrawing of borders elsewhere in the region, primarily in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. In the end, the ‘standards before status’ approach was very much about 
Kosovo as multiethnic. 
 Considering everything outlined above, it is not difficult to conclude that post-
1999 Kosovo has struggled to meet various expectations, both locally and 
internationally. Still, even if the lack of capacity to satisfy some of the initially 
promoted standards fully becomes less problematic over time,vi a clear-cut status will 
be required, sooner rather than later, so that Kosovo’s regional and international 
relations as well as memberships can be defined. As correctly observed by Ker-
Lindsay and Economides (2012, p. 85), ‘[w]here the question of Kosovo’s status 
becomes more complex and will become a major issue is when Kosovo reaches a 
stage whereby it is ready to establish a more formal relationship with the European 
Union, such as through the actual conclusion of a formal Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement. Although this would appear to be a long way off, if the current stalemate 






In contrast to the dominant expectations, the settlement of the Kosovo question has 
been rather slow, leaving the concerned parties bewildered. With a disputed 
proclamation of independence and without an already-long-awaited-for final status, it 
has become rather difficult to talk about the future of Kosovo. As demonstrated by the 
article, apart from the divisions characterising the Serb and Kosovo Albanian 
positions, the Europeans have also failed to offer a common position and strategy, 
capable of accommodating the Serbs, Kosovo Albanians, and, in fact, the whole 
Western Balkan region, even if such strategy would imply some painful compromises. 
This is an area where the question about the EU’s sincere willingness to support the 
creation of an independent Kosovo gains its full validity. However, while analysing 
the situation in May 1999, thus before the end of the NATO bombing of Serbia, one 
author observed the following: ‘Serbia will pay a high price for its attempted 
subordination and expulsion of the overwhelmingly Kosovar majority of its province. 
In the short term it is likely that there will be an increase in the number of refugees 
displaced from Kosovo. In the medium term there will be enormous costs in 
rebuilding the infrastructure of Serbia and Kosovo. It is likely that there will be a 
Greater Albania, as feared by the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and 
Greece. In the long term, NATO bombing without the use of ground force will point 
up the need for a European army if aggressive nationalism is to be deterred without 
resort to the destruction associated with air war. As America retreats from Europe, the 
states of Europe will have to go beyond calculations of national interest to assert a 
pan-European common interest in a milieu where both borders and groups are 
 10 
safeguarded subject to changes agreed by those affected, as in the case of German 
reunification’ (Brewin, 2001, p. 88).  
While going through the above outlined predictions, we can agree that Serbia 
has been paying a high price by not granting Kosovo an independent status and thus 
delaying its own progress towards the EU membership. As correctly predicted, in the 
short term, Serbs have increasingly left their enclaves, seeing them as a foreign 
territory in which they do not feel safe anymore. The ones who have stayed realised 
that they should be ready to cooperate and take part in Kosovo institutions; as 
explained elsewhere, ‘[t]his is owing to the fact that, not least because of its own 
parlous economic situation, exacerbated by the current global economic crisis, Serbia 
simply does not have the resources – or will not make them available – to support the 
southern enclaves economically’ (Džihić & Kramer, 2009, p. 9). Furthermore, the 
presence of the Albanian factor in Macedonia and Greece is often viewed as a 
synonym for instability and discussed in the context of a greater Albanian state, an 
ambition launched in 1878 by the League of Prizren, an Albanian political movement 
aimed at the defense of the Albanian nation.vii Concerning the long term predictions, 
the Brussels administration will have to establish a common position and stick to it, 
otherwise the involvement of some other parties will be required. The ongoing 
inconsistencies within the EU itself suggest that ‘the active engagement of the United 
States will be essential. Washington is still perceived by the Kosovars as their 
principal international backer’ (Lehne, 2012, p. 13). 
Today, half a decade after the proclamation of independence, when asked to 
assess the situation in Kosovo, its Albanian leadership tends to say that Kosovo is an 
indivisible state of big opportunities (Tanjug, 2013), while some other reports have 
clearly demonstrated that the overall situation in Kosovo is rather unstable and that 
many young people see no future there and, in fact, would like to leave (Deutsche 
Welle, 2013a). Needless to say, many observers have invested significant efforts to 
draft and recommend policies that, in their view, would work best so that the Kosovo 
question will be resolved and a new chapter in the history of Kosovo opened,viii but 
what they all tend to undermine is the fact that the only durable solution will be the 
one that will manage to please both the Serbs and Kosovo Albanians, rather than 
alienate them further. With this in mind, the EU-brokered April 2013 Agreement 
between Belgrade and Priština – assessed as ‘a landmark deal’ by the EU 
representatives (European Union, 2013), ‘the best possible offer’ by Ivica Dačić, 
Serbia’s prime minister (Politika, 2013), ‘a first and historic agreement between 
Serbia and Kosovo’ by Hashim Thaçi, Kosovo’s prime minister (Deutsche Welle, 
2013b), and as ‘a landmark opportunity to improve human rights protection’ by 
Human Rights Watch (2013) – could potentially be seen as a new chapter in the 
history of Kosovo, providing space for policy reconsiderations and, in fact, new 




i For a good overview of the riots, see P. F. R. Artisien & R. A. Howells (1981) 
Yugoslavia, Albania and the Kosovo Riots, The World Today, 37(11), pp. 419-427. 
ii For the description of the Račak massacre as a crime against humanity, see R. 
Bideleux & I. Jeffries (2007) The Balkans: A Post-Communist History (Oxon: 
Routledge), p. 542; E. Gordy (2013) Guilt, Responsibility and Denial: The Past at 
Stake in post-Milošević Serbia (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press), 
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p. 7; D. Kritsiotis (2000) The Kosovo crisis and NATO’s application of armed force 
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, 49(2), pp 330-359. 
iii For a full account of the 2004 events, see Human Rights Watch (2004) Failure to 
protect: Anti-minority violence in Kosovo, March 2004, 16(6D).   
iv For a detailed analysis of the talks, see M. Weller (2008) The Vienna negotiations 
on the final status of Kosovo, International Affairs, 84(4), pp. 659-681. 
v In addition, the International Crisis Group maintained that Kosovo should be 
allowed to have its own small army, supervised by NATO and focused on 
peacekeeping (ICG (2005) An army for Kosovo? Available at 
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/ICG/2247ac5f9f9ac4e9cbbbeeb 
13e5358bf.htm). 
vi For an EU’s softer tone with regard to the standards issue, see European 
Commission (2012) Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council on a Feasibility Study for a Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement between the European Union and Kosovo*, Brussels, 10 October 2012, 
COM(2012)602 final.  
vii On different discussions of a Greater Albania, see R. C. Austin (2004) Greater 
Albania: The Albanian state and the question of Kosovo, 1912-2001, in: J. Lampe & 
M. Mazower (Eds) Ideologies and National Identities: The Case of Twentieth Century 
Southeastern Europe, pp. 235-253 (Budapest: Central European University Press), J. 
Canak (Ed.) (1998) Greater Albania: Concepts and Possible Consequences 
(Belgrade: Institute of Geopolitical Studies), and P. Kola (2003) In Search of Greater 
Albania (London: C. Hurst & Co.). 
viii See, for example, International Crisis Group (2012) Kosovo and Serbia: A little 
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